Effort testing in children on neuropsychological and symptom validity measures by Rambo, Philip Louis
   EFFORT TESTING IN CHILDREN ON  
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL  
AND SYMPTOM VALIDITY MEASURES 
 
 
   By 
      PHILIP LOUIS RAMBO 
Bachelor of Science in Psychology  
   Texas A&M University 
   College Station, Texas 
   2002 
 
   Master of Science in Clinical Psychology  
   Oklahoma State University 
   Stillwater, Oklahoma 
   2008 
 
 
   Submitted to the Faculty of the 
   Graduate College of the 
   Oklahoma State University 
   in partial fulfillment of 
   the requirements for 
   the Degree of 
   DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
   December, 2011  
ii 
 
   EFFORT TESTING IN CHILDREN ON  
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL  




   Larry Mullins 
  Dissertation Adviser 
   John Chaney 
Committee Member 
   Melanie Page 
Committee Member 
   John Romans 
  Outside Committee Member 
  Sheryl A. Tucker 
   Dean of the Graduate College 
iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
   Chapter            Page 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................1 
 
   II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Introduction to Malingering ...........................................................................................4 
Malingering Criteria.......................................................................................................6 
Methods of Detecting Malingering ................................................................................8 
Types of Designs..........................................................................................................13 
Children and Malingering ............................................................................................15 
Cross Validation Literature ..........................................................................................16 
Malingered Impairment Literature……………………………………………………20 
 








   IV. RESULTS 
 
Analyses .......................................................................................................................41 
Intellectual Measures ...................................................................................................43 
Neuropsychological Measures .....................................................................................44 
Symptom Validity Measures........................................................................................44 
Examiner Observations ................................................................................................45 
Examiner Accuracy ......................................................................................................46 
Reported Strategies ......................................................................................................47 
 







Appendix A: OSU IRB Approval ................................................................................68 
























LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
   TABLES 
 
Table 1 Demographics .................................................................................................54 
Table 2 Univariate Effects ...........................................................................................56 







 Malingering in adult populations has received considerable scientific inquiry in 
the recent decades (Larrabee, 2003).  As a result, measures of malingering are quickly 
becoming a standard component of adult neuropsychological evaluations (Iverson, 2003).  
Despite this expansion in effort testing of adults, paucity exists in the literature with 
regard to malingering in younger populations.  While it is unclear why this area has 
received so little attention, the potential for malingering in children certainly warrants 
serious consideration, as children as young as four years of age have been found capable 
of utilizing deceptive strategies for material gain or to avoid punishment (Polack & 
Harris, 1999; Netwon, Reddy, & Bull, 2000; Ruffman, Olson, Ash, & Keenan, 1993; 
Sodian, Taylor, Harris, & Perner, 1991).         
 The extant literature on malingering in children suggests that children are capable 
of intentionally lowering their cognitive performances (Blaskewiz, Merten, & Kathman, 
2008; Constaniou & McCaffrey, 2003); however, it appears that they may utilize 
different approaches to feigning impairment than adults.  For example, it appears that 
children are more likely to exhibit an inconsistent malingered presentation, shifting in-
and-out of underperforming, whereas adults are more likely to lower their entire
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cognitive performance or focus on a specific cognitive domain (e.g., memory) (Blaskewiz, 
Merten, & Kathman, 2008).  As a result of this inconsistency, identifying children who are 
not providing a valid effort may prove more difficult than identifying adults.    
One approach to identifying malingering is to include symptom validity measures 
during evaluations. Symptom validity measures are specifically designed to differentiate sub-
optimal effort from true mild-moderate cognitive impairment (Larrabee, 2003).  Recent 
efforts to cross-validate adult symptom validity measures in child populations have yielded 
mixed findings. More specifically, the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) shows promise 
(Blaskewiz, Merten, & Kathman, 2008; Nagle, Everhart, Durham, McCammon, & Walker, 
2006) but other symptoms validity measures have not fared as well, particularly with younger 
children (Constaniou & McCaffrey,2003; Courtney, Dinkins, Allen, & Kuroski, 2003).   
Another strategy to identify malingering in adults involves detecting patterns of 
performance on standard neuropsychological measures (Larrabee, 2003; Mittenberg, Azrin, 
Millsaps, & Heilbronner, 1993; Suhr & Boyer, 1999).  While this approach has demonstrated 
promise in adult populations, it has received little attention in children (Blaskewitz, Merten, 
and Kathmann, 2008; Faust, Hart, and Guilmette, 1988).    
The specific aim of the present study was to expand the literature on effort testing 
with children in three specific areas. First, the study further examined the validity of the 
TOMM in a child sample, as this measure has demonstrated promise with younger 
populations (Blaskewitz, Merten, and Kathmann, 2008; Constantinou & McCaffrey, 2003; 
Nagle, Everhart, Durham, McCammon, and Walker, 2006).  Second, this study was the first 
to gather data on children’s malingered performances on the Dot Counting Test. Third, this 
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study was the first to measure malingered performances on a few standard 







REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 Malingering is defined as faking a condition in order to obtain some secondary 
gain (e.g., miss work, obtain financial compensation).  While this area has not received 
significant scientific inquiry until fairly recently (Larrabee, 2007), feigning psychiatric 
and/or medical symptoms easily predates modern society, with examples dating as far 
back as the Old Testament when David “acted like a madman” and “allowed saliva to run 
down his beard” because he was afraid of King Achish (I Samuel 21:13, New 
International Version).  Over the years, different systems for identifying those who were 
exaggerating or feigning a condition were developed which typically involved observing 
for overt behavioral inconsistencies, questioning the individual regarding their symptoms, 
or threatening/conducting various medical procedures (Geller, Erlen, Kaye& Fisher, 
1990).  However, it was not until the early 20th century with the Compensation Acts of 
1906 and the First World War that the identification of malingering began receiving 
serious consideration (Chesterman, Terbeck, & Vaughan, 2008).   
 More recently, identifying malingerers has received considerable attention in the 
area of neuropsychological assessment (Larrabee, 2007).  This is primarily due to the 
nature of this form of evaluation, as neuropsychological testing relies almost entirely on 
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the validity of the individual’s performance, which is susceptible to a variety of factors 
including motivation, fatigue, other psychological contributors, and malingering.  In fact 
one recent study found that effort accounts for over 50% of the variability in 
neuropsychological evaluations (Green, Rohling, Lees-Haley, & Allen, 2001).  Given
these findings, it is of utmost importance for clinicians to be accurate in recognizing 
when cognitive performances are inconsistent with actual neuropsychological 
functioning.  
Base Rates  
Malingering base rates are difficult to establish given that malingerers a  rarely 
likely to admit that they are not putting forth an honest effort, thus the identification of 
these individuals relies on the clinician’s own observations and interpretation of test
performance.  In addition, it must be supposed that a certain subset of malingerers, who 
are more trained and/or more sophisticated in their feigned clinical presentation, are 
likely never suspected of sub-optimal effort.  This issue is further complicated by those 
individuals who have true cognitive deficits but still intentionally underperform on 
testing (symptom exaggeration).  This would be a difficult base rate to establish but 
presumably would be quite high, particularly in litigious circumstances.  Despite thes  
limitations, some studies have been conducted that have provided some insight into the 
prevalence of this spurious behavior.  In general, it has been found the type of case (e.g., 
criminal, mild traumatic brain-injury) plays a large role in the presence of this behavior.  
The highest rates of malingering have been found to be associated with personal injury 
cases involving mild traumatic head injury, with roughly 40% of this population meeting 
criteria for malingering (Larrabee, 2003; Mittenberg, Patton, Canyock, & Condit, 2002; 
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Carroll, Abrahamse, & Vaian, 1995).  This inherently makes sense given that these are 
circumstances with a high probability of potential secondary gain.  Personal injury cases 
are followed by criminal cases, where as many as 20% of this population have been 
estimated to be malingering (Adolf, Denney, & Houston, 2007).  This is followed closely 
by disability evaluations, where malingering has been estimated to be as high as 15% 
(Chafetz & Abraham, 2005).  When expanding malingering criteria to include probable 
malingering, rates of malingering increase for these populations, with slightly over half 
estimated as meeting criteria in disability evaluations (Chafetz,& Abraham, 2005), while 
estimates in criminal settings have been as high as one-third (Adolf, Denney, & Houston, 
2007).   
Malingering Criteria 
When diagnosing malingering, it is important to determine how malingering is 
going to be defined.  In the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) malingering is listed as an additional condition that 
may be a focus of clinical attention and is defined as the intentional production of false or 
grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms which are motivated by external 
incentives.  In addition, the DSM notes that malingering should be of particular concern 
when clients are referred by an attorney for clinical examination, when there is marked 
discrepancy between subjective suffering and objective data, and when there is a lack of 
cooperation during the evaluation.  Finally, this set of criteria also includes the warning 
that there is an increased likelihood of malingering when Antisocial Personality Disorder 
is present (DSM-IV-TR). 
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While the DSM-IV-TR can be helpful in providing some general guidance in 
diagnosing malingering, it is insufficient in providing a thorough evaluative framework 
as it does not provide a definitive set of diagnostic criteria, instead only offering some 
guidelines and suggestions regarding this behavior.  One problem with this approach is 
that by not providing explicit criteria for malingering the diagnosis relies heavily on the 
clinician’s subjective interpretation of these guidelines.  Slick, Sherman, and Iverson 
(1999) attempted to offer a more comprehensive set of criteria for maligning that was 
based on the discrepancy method (the discrepancy between the presentation of the client 
and what is typically expected with the given condition).     
The Slick criteria for malingering are as follows: 
1. The presence of substantial external incentive (at least one) 
2. Evidence from neuropsychological data (e.g., discrepancy between observed 
behavior and test data, discrepancy between client history and test data) 
3. Evidence from self-report (e.g., self-report is inconsistent with known patterns 
of the disorder, self-report evidences exaggeration) 
4. The behaviors meeting criteria for 2 & 3 are not fully accounted for by a 
psychiatric, neurological, or developmental condition and are intentionally 
aimed at gaining an external incentive. 
 
An advantage to Slick et al.’s diagnostic approach is that it provides a more 
concrete diagnostic foundation for use in empirical studies.  While research comparing 
malingerers from controls in the past has relied on more subjective methods of 
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categorizing malingerers, the Slick criteria should lead to more precision and agreement 
in identifying this behavior. Ultimately, this should lead to a more accurate 
conceptualization of those who malinger. 
Methods of Detecting Malingering 
 Currently, there are three primary methods that are utilized in the detection of 
malingering in cognitive testing.  These include personality measures that utilize validity 
scales in determining the individual’s approach to the measures, measures that are
specifically designed to capture sub-optimal effort in specific cognitive areas (e.g., 
memory), and the identification of malingering through patterns of performance on 
standard neuropsychological measures.  Because this review is concerned with 
malingering as it occurs during neuropsychological testing, only the symptom validity 
measures and patterns of performance will be addressed.          
Modern Malingering Measures 
One of the most popular methods of detecting malingering involves the use of a 
group of specialized tests that are aimed at identifying those who are intentio ally 
underperforming cognitively (Larrabee, 2007).  In general, these measures are designed 
to be sensitive to sub-optimal effort, while at the same time insensitive to true cognitive 
impairment.  It also should be noted that when severe cognitive impairment is suspected 
it is important to consider the possibility of a false positive because these malingering 
measures presume that the examinee has no significant impairments (Larrabee, 2003). 
While a description of all the measures that fall in this category is beyond the scop  of 
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this review, a few of the more common symptom validity measures (Slick, Tan, Str uss, 
& Hultsch, 2004) are described below:   
Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) 
 The TOMM (Tombaugh, 1996) is one of the most studied and commonly used 
tests for assessing malingered effort during cognitive testing.  It is a forced-choice 
recognition test that consists of an initial presentation of 50 items consisting of simple 
drawings of common items, followed by an immediate and a delayed recognition trial of
the items.  During the recognition trials, the subject is presented with 50 items (both new 
and old) and indicates whether they recognize the item, the administrator then indicates 
whether they are correct or incorrect (the first trial is actually considered a recognition 
task in which the subject is oriented to the correct items a second time, whereas t  
second trial measures for sub-optimal effort).  During the second (final) recognition trial, 
the subject is not prompted regarding their correctness.  Malingering is suspected on this 
measure if the individual scores below 45 correct (worse than chance) on the second trial 
(Tombaugh, 1996).    
Rey 15 Item Test 
 The Rey 15 Item Test (or Rey 15) is a brief measure of malingering that is 
presented as a memory test.  The Rey 15 consists of 3 columns and 5 rows containing 15 
total items; however, the items are broken into 5 categorical groups containing 3 items in 
each set.  In addition, 2 of the categorical groups are variants of the same set.  Although 
there are multiple ways of administering this measure, the typical administration involves 
presenting the stimuli for 10 seconds after which the subject writes all of the items down 
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that they can remember.  Administration also sometimes involves an introduction to the 
measure that cues the participant that this test will be quite difficult, as it involves the 
memorization of several items over a short span of time.  The typical cut-off for 
malingering on this measure is a score less than 9 out of 15, although this varies (Strauss, 
Sherman, & Spreen, 2006).  While the Rey 15 is one of the more commonly used tests in 
assessing malingering (this is likely due to its brevity), it has consistently demonstrated 
low rates of specificity and sensitivity and thus should not be considered sufficient from 
the standpoint of assessing effort (Rey, 1958).  Finally, in an effort to address the 
problems with the Rey, the Rey was recently revised to the Rey-II; however, one rece t 
study which administered the Rey-II in conjunction with the TOMM found that the Rey-
II still suffers from low sensitivity and specificity (Whitney, Hook, Steiner, Shepard, & 
Callaway, 2008).      
Word Memory Test 
 The Word Memory Test is a computerized measure of malingering that involves 
the presentation of semantically linked word pairs.  Similar to the TOMM, the 
malingering portion of the Word Memory Test is a forced choice task that requires the 
participant to choose between one of the originally presented words and a new word that 
is in the same semantic category.  This forced choice portion occurs twice, imm diately 
following the initial presentation of the stimuli and after a 30 minute delay.  During each 
of these trials the participant is prompted regarding the correctness of their response.  
One advantage of the Word Memory Test over other malingering measures is that it also 
includes a series of memory tests that are administered following the recognition tasks.  
These include a multiple choice task (in which the participant is given a word and 
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chooses from eight other words to identify its pair), paired associates (in which the 
person receives the first word and recalls the pair), and a free recall task that requires the 
participant to recall as many words as they can.  These memory tests are administered 
from least difficult (multiple choice) to most difficult (free recall) to facilitate 
memorization of the pairings (Green, Allen, & Astner, 1996).         
Computerized Assessment of Response Bias (CARB) 
 The CARB is a computerized measure of malingering that was formulated on the 
Hiscock and Hiscock procedure (1989).  Administration involves the participant viewing 
5 digits, followed by a 2 second delay, and then having to choose between two 5 digit 
numbers, one of which is the original.  The CARB is similar to other digit tasks of 
malingering, however, it is computer administered which offers a couple of unique 
advantages.  First, by being computer administered, the CARB allows for stricter con rol 
with regard to standard administration.  This ensures that the CARB should be essentially 
the same task regardless of administrator as the likelihood of administrative eror is 
virtually removed.  Second, the computer administration also allows for the respondent’s 
latency to be measured.  This is important as delayed responding has been found to be 
associated with malingered performances (Allen, Conder, Green, & Cox, 1997; Green & 
Iverson, 2001).   
Patterns of Neuropsychological Performance 
 While measures of malingering are useful in providing relatively straightforward 
methods of assessing for feigned effort, they also suffer from a few potential weaknesses.  
First, it is possible that more sophisticated individuals are capable of detecting the 
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purpose of these measures.  This is mainly due to the possibility that malingering 
measures (e.g., Rey 15) may appear relatively easy when compared to othermeasu es 
that constitute a typical cognitive battery.  For this reason, it has been recomm nded that 
malingering measures be used at the beginning of the evaluation, when expectations 
regarding the difficulty of these tests is likely shrouded in ambiguity.  In addition, as 
these have been used more and more frequently, awareness of these measures has risen 
outside of the psychological assessment community (Mittenberg, Patton, Canyock, & 
Condit, 2002).  As a result, the likelihood that examinees have been provided with 
general information regarding the presence of symptom validity measures or have been 
strategically coached on how to perform on specific measures has risen (Youngjohn, 
1995).  In order to circumvent this possibility, abnormal patterns on standard measures of 
neuropsychological functioning have been identified (Larrabee, 2003).     
 Several standard neuropsychological measures have been identified as offering
some degree of utility in identifying sub-optimal levels of effort.  These include digit 
span on the Wechsler scales (scaled scores that are 5 or less, total digit forward that is 4 
or less, etc.) (Griffenstein, Baker, & Gola, 1994; Larrabee 2003), the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Task (higher occurrence of perseverative errors and failures to maintain set) 
(Suhr & Boyer, 1999; Bernard, McGrath, & Houston, 1996), and poorer performances on 
gross motor tasks relative to fine motor skill (Griffenstein, Baker, & Gola,1996; Heaton, 
Smith, Lehman, & Vogt, 1978; Mittenberg, Rotholic, Russell, & Heilbronner, 1996), to 
name a few.  Overall, the use of neuropsychological measures in assessing malingering 
has distinct advantages over relying solely on the standard symptom validity measures in 
that they (1) allow for the continual assessment of malingering throughout the evaluation 
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(Meyers & Volbrecht, 2003), (2) are more resistant than symptom validity measur s to 
being identified as malingering tests because they are actual measures of cognitive 
performance (Youngjohn, 1995), (3) allow for assessment across a broad array of 
cognitive conditions, whereas symptom validity measures typically address on  cognitive 
domain (e.g., recognition memory), and (4) are more time efficient given that they do not 
require additional effort testing measures be added to the battery administered (Meyers & 
Volbrecht, 2003). Overall, when addressing malingering in the context of a 
neuropsychological evaluation, it is recommended to not over rely on either of these 
methods and, rather, consider both symptom validity measures and performance patterns
on neuropsychological tests when establishing the validity of a cognitive performance 
(Slick, 1999).     
Types of Designs 
Typically, studies addressing malingering utilize one of two study designs: 
simulation or known-group designs, with the former being the most common design.  
With simulation designs, the participants are instructed or “coached” to underperform on 
cognitive measures (in studies dealing with personality, the participants typically attempt 
to fake a mental disorder).  As the name implies, the participants in these studies are 
presumably simulating malingering and are thus not malingering in the purest sense.  As 
a result, the validity of the “malingering” that occurs in these studies is clearly a 
weakness of this design as it is difficult (if not impossible) to know for sure that these 
individuals are malingering in a fashion consistent with how malingering actually occurs 
in clinical settings.  One attempt to address this concern has been the use of small 
rewards for successful malingering.  In these studies the participant is typically informed 
14 
 
that they will receive some financial incentive for lowering their performance, but not to 
an obvious degree.  While this would seem helpful in eliciting performances that more 
likely represent actual malingering, the research has not always supported the 
effectiveness of providing these types of rewards (Bernard, 1990).    
Another disadvantage to simulation designs is the simulation-malinger paradox 
(Rogers & Cavanaugh, 1983), which involves asking someone to comply with 
malingering and then drawing comparisons with individuals who do not comply when 
asked to, which is clearly a contradiction.  Despite these weaknesses, one advantage to 
this design is that it offers a high degree of control and flexibility with regard to the 
overall study design.  In addition, this design also offers the advantage of being a le to
easily compare between groups of simulated malingerers (e.g., coached vs. un-coached), 
clinical/neurologic populations, and/or controls (Rogers, Harrell, & Liff, 1993).     
In contrast, known-group designs examine malingering in individuals who are 
presumed to be actively malingering (or whose data was collected when they were 
malingering). One obvious advantage to this approach is that it offers greater external 
validity given that these individuals have been identified as malingerers and thus a part of 
the population of interest.  However, one problem with this design is that there is not 
always agreement regarding who fits the criteria for malingering.  As mentioned before, 
the DSM-IV-TR does provide some general guidelines in determining malingered 
performance; however, there is clearly a certain degree of subjectivity when using these 
guidelines in real world settings.  As a result, it is possible that some of the individuals in 





Children and Malingering 
Malingering in adults has been one of the more extensively researched areas in 
recent years (Larrabee, 2003).  Despite the growing interest in adults’ deceptive capacity, 
little effort has been made in determining children’s ability to fake cognitive deficits.  
This is concerning given that past research has demonstrated children as young as pre-
school ages have been identified as engaging in deceptive behaviors, particularly when 
they are benefited by avoiding punishment or through some material gain (Netwon, 
Reddy, & Bull, 2000; Polack & Harris, 1999).   
Before examining the literature on malingering in children, the issue of why a 
child would malinger needs to be addressed.  One reason that a child might engage in 
malingering involves one of the basic psychological mechanisms: avoidance.  Avoidance 
is defined as mentally or physically avoiding something that causes some degre of 
distress (Merriam-Webster’s, 2002).  In terms of malingering in children, th  classic 
avoidance scenario involves the child who feigns an illness in order to stay home from 
school.  While this presumably common behavior seems benign on the surface, due to the 
secondary gain involved in avoiding the “distressful” situation, when a child engages in 
this type of behavior they are malingering.   
Litigious circumstances provide the most obvious scenario in which a child would 
be motivated to feign cognitive deficits.  Here, secondary gain would be through more 
traditional avenues of direct financial compensation or, perhaps, material compensation 
from some older entity.  Given that personal injury claims, on the whole, appear to be on 
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the rise (National Center for State Courts, 2008), the need to establish diagnostic 
malingering guidelines specific to younger populations clearly warrants further scientific 
inquiry.   
One final area that has been identified more recently involving malingering and 
younger individuals involves the feigning of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD) in order to obtain medications and/or favorable academic accommodations.  In 
recent decades, the increase in young individuals seeking evaluations for thidisorder has 
increased substantially (Harrison, Edwards, & Parker, 2007; Nichols, Harrison, 
McCloskey, & Weintraub, 2002).  This issue is further complicated by diagnostic 
approaches that rely entirely on interview and self-report measures, thus making 
successful deception exceptionally easy (Harrison, Edwards, & Parker, 2007).  
Those who have investigated malingering in younger populations have typically 
taken two approaches in attempting to address this neglected area, either through cross-
validating adult measures of malingering on samples of children or through actually 
measuring the capacity of children to intentionally lower their performance o  measures 
of cognition and/or symptom validity measures.   
Cross-Validation Literature 
In 2003, Constantinou and McCaffrey conducted a study that examined children’s 
performance on both the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) and on the Rey 15 item 
test.  The authors listed four main goals for this project: 1) to collect a normative d a for 
children on the TOMM, 2) to demonstrate that children’s performance on the TOMM is 
comparable to adults, 3) to demonstrate that the TOMM is unaffected by age, education, 
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and cultural background, and 4) to compare children’s performance on the TOMM with 
the Rey-15-item test.  This study utilized two samples of children, one in the United 
States and one in Cyprus.  All of the children in this study (61 in Cyprus and 67 in the 
United States) were first administered the TOMM, followed by the Rey 15-item-test.   
Overall, Constantinou and McCaffrey found support for the use of the TOMM as 
a valid measure of children’s effort, with every child receiving a score above the cut-off 
by at least the retention trial (3rd trial).  Two children from Cyprus did not score above 
cut-off on the second trial of this measure; however, these children were also the only 
children in this study who were accompanied by their parents and, as the authors point 
out, the presence of a third party can be detrimental to neuropsychological performance.  
No significant differences were found between TOMM performance and the children’s 
age, education, and cultural background.   
Performances on the Rey 15 item test were not as promising, as this test 
correlated highly with both age and education.  Also, several of the younger children did 
not achieve the cut-off score for this measure, thus incorrectly suggesting ls than 
reasonable effort by these children.  As a result, the authors concluded that the Rey15-
item-test is not an appropriate measure of malingering in the very young.  It was noted, 
however, that as the children’s age increased their performance on the Rey-15 increased 
as well, suggesting that perhaps this measure is appropriate for children above the ag  of 
9, although they recommended further investigation to fully clarify this possibility.   
While Constanitnou and McCaffrey indicated that the TOMM appears to be a 
valid measure of effort in healthy children, it was still not known whether the TOMM 
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would also be a valid measure in a clinically referred sample of children.  Donders (2005) 
attempted to address this issue through an investigation that examined the validity of the 
TOMM on a large clinically referred pediatric sample.  In this study, 100 children with 
documented clinical diagnoses were administered the TOMM and the California Verb l
Learning Test, Children’s Version (CVLT-C) as part of a flexible neuropsychological 
battery (the CVLT-C was included in order to offer a memory comparison for the TOMM 
performances).  The working diagnoses varied, although roughly half were being 
evaluated following a traumatic brain injury.   
Overall, only three of the 100 children did not reach the minimal cut-off for the 
TOMM.  The author indicated that of these three, two were accurately identifed as sub-
optimally performing across the cognitive battery, while the last child was likely a false 
positive.  Donders also found a slightly significant correlation between age and TOMM 
performance, even though 21 out of the 23 children in the youngest age group (6 – 8 
years) still performed above cut-off for this measure.  There was no correlati n between 
the CVLT-C and the TOMM, which suggests that the TOMM is still assessing effort in 
children.  Overall, the author concluded that this investigation provides further evidence 
for the potential of the TOMM as a measure of effort in children and that the normal 
“adult” cut-off of 45 appears to be appropriate with children as well (as 97% of 
participants met or exceeded this cut-off). This study also expanded the past liter ture by 
demonstrating the TOMM’s utility in a pediatric sample.            
Courtney, Dinkins, Allen, and Kuroski (2003) conducted a study that examined 
the effect of age on performance on two computerized effort tests, the Computerized 
Assessment of Response Bias (CARB) and the Word Memory Test (WMT).  In this 
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investigation, 111 children were administered these two measures in conjunction as part 
of a comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation.  The children were between the ages 
of 6 and 17, with the majority being referred for attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder or 
learning disability evaluations.  In line with the authors’ hypotheses, the findings suggest 
that children who were below 11 years of age were significantly more likely to produce 
performances on both of these measures that would suggest the possibility of reduced 
effort, even though it is presumed that all children were putting forth normal effort.  In 
addition, the authors also found that reading ability may have contributed to the poorer 
performance on the WMT, as children with lower reading levels had more difficulty 
achieving normal performances on this test.  As a result, the authors advise against using 
the CARB or WMT measures with younger children, particularly when the children are 
suspected of developmental disabilities and/or have suspected reading difficulties.          
Green and Flaro (2003) also conducted a study that examined the performance of 
children on the WMT (this study was an extension of Flaro and Green, 2000, which used 
similar methodology but included the CARB).  The participants in this study were 135 
children between the ages of 7 and 18 who were referred for a neuropsychological 
evaluation for a wide range of diagnostic purposes.  The children were divided into two 
categories, a psychiatric group (e.g., oppositional defiant disorder, schizophrenia) and a 
neurologic group (e.g., fetal alcohol syndrome, Asperger’s).  As part of the 
neuropsychological evaluation, each of these children received the WMT, Californi  
Verbal Learning Test, Children’s Version (CVLT-C), and the Rey Complex Figure Test. 
Other aspects of the battery varied based on individual diagnostic considerations.  Four 
adult groups were also utilized for comparison with the children’s performance, these 
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included a community sample of healthy adults, two head injury groups (moderate-severe 
and mild head injury), and a neurological group consisting of strokes, brain tumors, and 
multiple sclerosis.   
Overall, Green and Flaro found that this measure has utility as a measure of effort 
with children.  Interestingly, age, intelligence, and diagnostic category were not found to 
be related to overall performance on the effort portion of the WMT; however, reading 
level was related to lower effort scores, specifically when the child’s reading level was 
below third-grade.  Another interesting finding included the children performing better 
than the minimal brain injury group, which is consistent with past research that suggests 
that this group is particularly likely to engage in symptom exaggeration.  In conclusi , 
this Green and Flaro’s investigation of the WMT demonstrates promise for the use of this 
measure in determining the presence of response bias in children, although the autors’
suggest that this measure needs further validation and highly recommended assessing 
reading level before making determinations of effort with this test.   
Malingered Impairment Literature 
The first attempt to address malingered neuropsychological performances within a 
child population was conducted by Faust, Hart, and Guilmette in 1988.  In their study, 
three children between the ages of 9 and 12 were administered a battery of measures that 
included the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised (WISC-R) and the 
Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Test Battery for Older Children.  B fore completing 
these measures, the children were instructed to lower their cognitive performance but not 
so much as to be detected by the technician, who was blind to the study.  Additionally, 
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the participants were told that if they were successful in lowering their performance 
without being detected, they would receive extra compensation (an extra $5.00).   
After the test batteries were conducted, the cognitive data were mailed to 240
judges for diagnostic interpretation. Also in the mailing was a brief vignette tha  
described a child whose medical evaluation following an automobile accident was 
unremarkable but exhibited a decline in academic performance and reported experiencing 
memory difficulties.  Judges were asked to complete a form that provided a number of 
multiple choice diagnostic options, including whether they felt the performance was 
normal and the type of abnormality that they felt best fit the data and history (cortical 
dysfunction, functional impairment, or malingering).  Overall, only one-third of the 
mailings were returned with none of the respondents indicating a diagnosis of 
malingering.  The authors argued that the incorrect diagnostic responses from the 
clinicians provided clear evidence that children are capable of feigning believable 
neuropsychological deficits.   
Despite the authors’ conclusions, there are a few notable concerns with this 
investigation, particularly with the study design that may raise concern regarding the 
generalizability of the findings.  First, the children’s intellectual f nctioning was not 
established prior to the feigned performance.  Without first determining the actual 
intellectual capcity of the child, the authors cannot definitively establish that 
underperformance indeed occurred (that the child actually malingered).  As a result, it is 
possible that the protocols did not actually represent poor effort in children.   
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Second, the assessors were not provided with behavioral observations regarding 
the children’s presentations.  As indicated in both the DSM-IV guidelines as well as 
Slick’s criteria, behavioral observations are a critical element in establishing the 
consistency between cognitive functioning and observable symptomology.  By only 
providing a summary of the children’s cognitive scores and brief history, the assessor  
were not provided with enough information to gain a more complete conceptualization of 
the children, particularly with regard to the validity of their presentation.   
Finally, there were also a few potential issues with the survey respondents.  Firs , 
the low response rate from clinicians (23%) could possibly be evidence that some of the 
clinicians who did not respond had concerns regarding the study (e.g. methodology), 
although this is purely speculative.  Second, the clinicians were broadly categorized as 
“neuropsychologists,” although there was a wide range of reported specialization in this 
area, with some clinicians reporting minimal training in neuropsychological assessment.  
This raises the possibility that, for at least some of the respondents, the lack of 
malingering diagnoses may have been a function of inadequate experience assessing 
effort within the context of neuropsychological assessment.       
Bigler (1988) offered a comment on Faust, Hart, and Guilmette’s 1988 
investigation and identified several potential weaknesses.  First, Bigler ar ued that the 
history that was provided to the respondents did not offer the depth of information that is 
typically gained through standard clinical practice.  For example, there was no 
opportunity to speak with the referring professional, conduct thorough diagnostic and 
neurologic interviews, or obtain medical reports/imaging results.  In addition, Bigler 
noted that the nature of questionnaires may lead to higher rates of over-diagnosing.  F r 
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instance, when provided with a high score on a measure of cognitive impairment, the 
judge may be likely to attribute the score to being related to cognitive impair ent simply 
out of lack of alternative explanations.  Bigler also commented on the qualifications of 
the respondents; only 17% of the clinicians had completed postdoctoral training in 
neuropsychology and little evidence was provided to verify the competence of these 
clinicians.  Finally, Bigler contended that due to the relatively rare occurrence of 
malingering in children, the respondents should have been informed at the onset that this 
was a study of malingering and base rates of malingering should have been provided.      
Faust, Hart, Guilmette, and Arkes (1988) conducted another investigation at 
roughly the same time as their child malingering study that replaced the children with 
adolescents.  This study consisted of two independent evaluative conditions, the firstwith 
3 adolescents who feigned cognitive impairment and 1 actual head injury case, while the 
second study only included 2 of the malingered protocols with an additional head injury 
protocol.  Again, the clinicians were provided with a multiple choice form to determin  
the likely cause of the cognitive performance, with cortical dysfunction, functional 
impairment, or malingering as options.  The clinicians were also instructed to rate their 
diagnostic confidence.   
With the exception of the one legitimate protocol, the first study was essentially 
the same as their malingering study with children, with 3 adolescents being instructed to 
fake bad on a standard neuropsychological battery (e.g., Halstead Reitan, WISC-R). 
These results were summarized and mailed to neuropsychologists along with a brief 
vignette involving the adolescent being involved in an automobile accident.  Roughly 
one- third of clinicians returned the forms.  The malingered conditions combined resulted 
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in “abnormal” ratings of 78%, while the injury case resulted in 100% abnormal ratings; 
however, out of the 3 diagnostic options given, none of the respondents indicated 
malingering in any of the 4 protocols, which is consistent with the original invest gation.    
In the second study, clinicians each received 2 protocols taken from the 2 
malingered protocols and 2 head injury protocols (with 6 evenly distributed pair wise 
possibilities).  In addition, they received a cover letter that provided details regarding the 
“50% base rate for malingering in the data sample.”  The authors indicated that the reason 
for this letter was to see if forewarning clinicians regarding the possibility of malingering 
would increase the likelihood of their making this diagnosis. The respondents did indicate 
malingering in 10% of the 90% of the protocols that were determined to be abnormal.  
However, the authors noted that the forewarning regarding malingering resulted in less 
ratings of abnormality overall.  They further argued that this warning likely ncreased the 
threshold for diagnosing abnormality, which ultimately could result in less accur y in 
diagnosing more mildly impaired individuals (false negatives) while diagnosing the more 
exaggerated malingerers as impaired (false positives), which, did occur in their findings.  
Overall, this investigation suffered from some of the same methodological weaknesses as 
the original study (e.g., lack of behavioral observations, wide variance of respondent 
training), although the addition of the brain injury protocols did provide a comparison for 
the malingered performances.    
In 2006, Nagle, Everhart, Durham, McCammon, and Walker conducted an 
investigation that attempted to compare “feigned” impairment with full effort children on 
forced choice recognition and on verbal learning.  In that study, 35 children ages 6-12 
were split into two groups with both of these groups completing a full-effort conditi 
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and a malingered condition (the only difference between the groups was that the order of
the conditions were reversed, with one group receiving the full-effort condition prior to 
the malingered condition and the other group receiving the malingered condition prior to 
the full-effort condition).  The TOMM was administered to capture performance o  a 
forced-choice task, while the Hopkins Verbal Learning Test-Revised (HVLT-R) was 
administered to capture the children’s verbal learning capacity.  In addition, Reading 
from the Wide Range Achievement Test-3rd edition (WRAT-3) was also obtained prior to 
these conditions in order to ensure that the children possessed basic verbal academic 
ability.  Finally, a checklist assessing knowledge of brain injury was devised to xplore 
the possibility that children who are more aware of the potential symptoms of brain 
injuries may perform differently in the feigning condition than their less informed peers.   
The authors hypothesized that when asked to do their best the children would 
perform on the TOMM at the same level as adults (which is consistent with past research 
examining this measure with children, see Constantinou & McCaffrey, 2003).  They also 
hypothesized that when the children were in the feigned condition, the children would 
perform beneath the cut-off for this measure (<45).  On verbal learning, it was 
hypothesized that full-effort condition overall would perform significantly better than the 
malingered condition.   
Overall, it was found that regardless of condition, children performed above the 
cut-off on the TOMM.  The authors suggest that this provides further evidence for the 
utility of this measure when attempting to address malingering in younger populations, 
although this raises concern regarding the sensitivity of this measure to malingering.  On 
the HVLT, in the first administration there were few significant differences between the 
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malingered and full-effort condition.  However, on the second administration, the 
children in malingered condition (who had already gone through the full effort condition) 
“remembered” significantly fewer words and evidenced less learning than the full effort 
condition.  The authors suggested that, at least for this measure, children may require 
prior exposure to the task before being able to successfully lower their memory 
performance.   
There are some notable strengths and weaknesses to this study.  As with 
Constaniou and McCaffrey, this study provides further evidence supporting the use of the 
TOMM with children 6 and older).  One caveat, however, is that the children in the 
malingered condition did not score below the cut-off.  While the authors indicated that 
the failure to reach cut-off may suggest that children have difficulty “faking” this 
measure, it is also possible that the children were lowering their performance, just not 
enough to be identified as possibly malingering.  Assuming that the children were 
lowering their performance, this could suggest that the TOMM is actually a poor measure 
of validity in children.  In addition, it is also possible that the children did not reach cut-
off because in this investigation they were only administered a few measures.  As a 
result, it is possible that they had not established a faking strategy which could have 
resulted in a higher score than may have been obtained in a full neuropsychological 
battery.  Their finding that children who first are administered the HVLT at full effort 
were able to lower their performance on the second administration offers some support 
for this hypothesis as this demonstrates that with some experience, the children were able 
to provide a more “impaired” performance, although without further exploration it is not
possible to definitely establish why these performance patterns occurred.        
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In 2008, Blaskewitz, Merten, and Kathmann conducted an investigation in 
Germany with children who were assigned to either an experimental group (malingering) 
or a control group (full effort) and were administered a battery of malingering measures.  
This battery included the TOMM, the Medical Symptom Validity Test (MSVT), and the 
Rey Fifteen-Item Test.  The children were also administered some standard 
neuropsychological tests.  These included digit span from the WISC-III, form A of the 
Trail Making Test, and Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices.  In order to elici  sub-
optimal effort in the experimental group, a script was read to the children involving a 
wizard coming to their school who was looking for an apprentice for his magic school.  
The script included the following: 
“…the wizard definitely does not want children that are smarter than him, but the 
wizard definitely does not want children who are stupid either so he would be able to 
teach them appropriately.” 
After the script was read, a simple memory task was conducted to see if the 
children understood the concept of intentionally underperforming.  If the child did not 
make a mistake following the first trial, then a second trial was conducted and if they did 
not make mistakes on the second trial they were excluded from the study.  Only one child 
was excluded as a result of not understanding the task.  Overall, Blaskewitz and 
colleagues found significant differences when comparing the full effort group fm the 
malingering group on all measures except the Raven’s and Trail’s A.  In addition, out of 
the 20 children in the malingered children, 19 failed at least one of the malingering 
measures and the majority failed three of these measures (n = 10), while only 2 children 
failed all effort measures.  Interestingly, the authors also indicated that the majority of 
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children did not appear to sustain their malingering effort throughout the entire battery.  
The authors noted that the children in the malingered condition tended to display an 
inconsistent pattern, underperforming on some measures while being apparently unaware 
of their role as a “sorcerer’s apprentice” on other measures.  They suggest that children 
may have difficulty maintaining their attentional awareness and/or motivati n to 
successfully sustain a consistent level of underperformance over an extended period of 
time.  In addition, the authors reported that the children had more success 
underperforming on some measures than others, as evidenced by more 
underperformances on the MSVT than on the TOMM (which is consistent with previous 
research which suggested that the TOMM may be problematic in detecting mali ered 
effort in children).  Finally, the authors offered the observation that the children had more 
difficulty lowering their performances in tasks where they were explicitly told to do 
something or when they were provided with immediate feedback, suggesting that 
children may struggle in maintaining their malingering when provided with feedback that 
is contrary to their underperforming.       
As for the control group, all participants scored above the cut-off for the TOMM 
trial 2 and retention trial (which had not been previously established).  In addition, almost 
all of the children were able to pass the MSVT.  Also, all of the children passed the Rey 
15 item test, which is contrary to the aforementioned study regarding the utility of this 
measure with younger children.  Finally, the digit span task (RDS) was failed by the 
majority of the full effort group, suggesting that this measure is not appropriate for 
younger populations.   
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 Overall, the Blaskewitz study provides a solid investigation on which to build 
future studies exploring response bias in children.  As described by the authors, one aea 
that may have contributed to the inconsistent underperformances in some of the children 
may involve the use of the sorcerer’s apprentice scenario.  Perhaps if a more plausible 
scenario had been provided or the children had been offered some external gain, then the 
children may have better maintained their motivation to underperform throughout the 
evaluation.   
Finally, one other study that warrants consideration was conducted by McKinzey, 
Prieler, and Raven in 2003 that examined children’s performance on the Raven’s 
Standard Progressive Matrices.  The purpose of this study was to cross-validate a formula 
that was developed by Gudjonsson and Shackleton (1986) for detecting malingering on 
the Raven’s using a sample of children.  In this study, 44 school aged children were 
administered the Raven’s twice, first with the standard instructions to do their best and 
second with the instructions: 
 “We know that some people don’t try their best on this test.  We’d like to find a 
way to catch them.  To help us, please do as badly on this test as you can, without getting 
caught.” 
Following these two administrations, the authors found that in the malingered 
condition the formula yielded a 64% false negative rate, suggesting that this formula may 
offer little when attempting to identify malingering in younger populations.  I terestingly 
however, after closer examination of the children’s response patterns in the malingered 
condition, the authors identified a subset of extremely easy items that increased the hit 
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rate of malingering on this measure to 95%.  This finding could suggest that children’s 
patterns of malingering may be different from adults.  Overall, this study provided the 
possibility of a new method for detecting sub-optimal effort in children.  However, this 
investigation did suffer from a few weaknesses.  First, providing the students a standard 
administration of the Raven’s before administration in the malingering scenario 
potentially damages the external validity of this study as children who are being assessed 
in actual clinical settings are not going to have the opportunity to practice the measure 
before they underperform on instruments.  In addition, the authors did not report if any 
effort was made to confirm that the children understood what was expected after they 
heard the malingering script.  This could potentially confound the findings, particul ly 
given that some of the children were very young and may not have understood their role 
in the study.   







 Malingering in adult populations has witnessed a rapid growth in the scientific 
literature over the past few decades.  As a result of this increase in inquiry, certain facets 
of this behavior have emerged that allow for more precision when identifying malingered 
effort in older populations.  These techniques include validity scales on personality 
measures, symptom validity tests that assess for simulated cognitive deficits, and patterns 
of performance on standard neuropsychological measures. One area that has been 
relatively neglected in the literature concerns malingered effort in younger populations.  
The extant literature that has attempted to provide clarity regarding children’s 
performance on symptom validity and neuropsychological tests has documented that, to 
some extent, children are capable of reducing their effort when instructed to do so; 
however, these efforts to explore malingering in children represent only preliminary 
investigations. 
 The purpose of the present study was to expand the current literature in children’s 
response bias in a few specific ways.  First, children’s malingered efforts on some 
common neuropsychological measures that have not been previously studied in this 
context were explored.  Overall, it was hypothesized that the children in the control
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would perform better on all of these measures than children in malingered condition.   
 Second, the present investigation also attempted to expand the literature by 
including a measure of malingering, the Dot Counting Test, that has not previously been 
examined in the context of malingered effort in children (Rey, 1941).  It was 
hypothesized that the children in the control condition would perform significantly bet er 
on this measure than the children in the malingered condition.     
Finally, this study attempted to further investigate the use of the TOMM with 
younger populations.  As described previously, the TOMM has shown promise as being a 
valid measure of effort; however, it has not been demonstrated that children who are 
underperforming actually score below the adult cut-off for this measure.  It was 
hypothesized that the children in the malingered condition would perform lower than the 
children in the control condition, however, it was expected that the majority of children 
would perform above the cut-off of 45 on both the 2nd trial and retention trial, regardless 
of condition.   
METHOD 
Participants  
 Participants included 38 children in the Stillwater, Oklahoma and greater Dallas, 
Texas communities.  The average age of participants was 9 (M = 9.72, SD = 2.01), with 
65% of the sample being girls and 35% being boys, although the sample included 
children as young as 6 and as old as 12.  Nearly the entire sample was Caucasian (97%).  
Roughly half (46%) of the participant’s families fell within the $50,000 to $75,000 
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annual income range, 35% were greater than $75,000, 13.5% fell within the $25,000 to 
$50,000 range, and 5.4% fell within the less than $25,000 range.   
 One participant was excluded from the study due to a previous diagnosis of 
mental retardation.  Randomization resulted in 18 children in the control condition and 19 
children in the treatment condition.  All 18 children in the control condition reported that 
they understood that they were to “try their best” for the remainder of the experiment.  In 
addition, all of the 19 participants in the poor effort condition were able to make at least 
one mistake on the second trial of the sample memory task, resulting in no children being 
excluded from the study due to not having a basic understanding of the underperforming 
role condition.   
 Prior to analyses, three additional participants were excluded due to potential 
inconsistencies in their presentation.  In the treatment condition, one subject was 
excluded because they reported to the first examiner that they tried their best on all of the 
tests with the second examiner.  This was consistent with this individual’s cognitive 
performance, as their KBIT-2 and WASI full scale intelligent quotients were highly 
consistent and their TOMM performances were not indicative of poor effort.  The second 
examiner also reported that this individual appeared to be putting forth their best effort on 
all tests.   
 A second subject in the treatment condition was excluded due to their having a 
slightly higher WASI intelligence quotient than KBIT-2 quotient and because they 
received perfect scores on the TOMM, thus raising serious concern that this individual 
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did not comply with the directions.  The second examiner also noted that this individual 
appeared highly motivated to do well on all the tests.   
 One of the participants in the control condition was excluded due to possible 
contamination, as this participant reportedly knew children who had previously gone 
through the experiment in the treatment condition and appeared to be putting forth less 
than reasonable effort on a few of the subtests.  For example, on block design, this 
participant received a raw score of zero, as they demonstrated significant difficulty in 
solving even the most basic two block configurations.  However, following the 
experiment, the first examiner had the subject attempt the blocks again with 
encouragement to be sure to try their best, at which point this individual evidenced no 
difficulty in quickly solving some of the more complex four block designs.  Due to this 
inconsistency, their data was excluded from analyses.              
 The removal of these participants resulted in both conditions having 17 children.  
The average age of the control condition was 10 (M = 10.06, SD = 1.85), while the 
average age in the treatment condition was 9 (M = 9.71, SD = 2.20).  The groups did not 
differ significantly for age, grade, or family income.  See table 1 for further detail 
regarding group characteristics.   
Measures 
 The following measures were administered to all participants.  The partici n s 
were first administered the KBIT-2 at full effort.  
Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test-2nd Edition (KBIT-2). The KBIT-2 is a measure 
of intellectual functioning that yields an overall intelligence composite as well as a verbal 
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and a nonverbal intelligence composite (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004).  Verbal 
intelligence is measured through two subtests, a measure of verbal knowledge and a 
measure that involves solving verbal riddles, while nonverbal intelligence is measured 
through a subtest of matrices.  Administration time for the entire test is roughly 20 
minutes.      
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI). The WASI (The 
Psychological Corporation, 1999) is an abbreviated measure of intelligence that provides 
reliable estimates of verbal, performance, and full scale intelligence quotients (IQ). 
Performance ability is measured by two tasks; the first involves manipulating three-
dimensional block designs while the second involves nonverbal abstract reasoning of 
matrices.  Verbal ability is also measure by two tasks; the first requires defining words 
while the second involves verbal abstraction where the participant is required to find 
similarities between two words.  Internal reliability for the WASI is reported to be .92 in 
adults according to the test publisher.  Also, the full scale IQ’s obtained from this 
measure correlate .92 with IQ’s obtained from the W chsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
(WAIS-III) (Psychological Corporation, 1999).       
 Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM). The TOMM is a forced choice recognition 
task that is one of the most frequently administered measures of malingering (Tombaugh, 
1996).  The TOMM has demonstrated some validity as an effort measure with children 
with even young children being able to perform at or above the cut-off; however, it 
remains unclear if this measure is sensitive to malingering in children.  In adults, 
malingering is suspected on this measure if the individual scores below 45 correct on the 
second trial.  
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 Dot Counting Test. The Dot Counting Test (Rey, 1941) is a brief measure of 
malingered effort that involves counting sets of dots that are presented on a computer.  
More specifically, the task requires the participant to count a set of dots as quickly as 
possible.  The first six sets of dots are ungrouped, whereas the last six sets of dots are 
grouped in closer proximity to each other.  Normal effort is evidenced by the participant 
counting the latter six sets more quickly than the original dot sets.   
Fingertapping. Fingertapping is a simple test of motor speed and motor control 
that was originally part of the Halstead-Reitan Battery (Halsted, 1947).  This procedure 
involves having the participant tap a mechanism that is fastened to a wooden board as 
quickly as they can.  Previous research has indicated that underperforming in adults may 
be present when the total score for both hands (left performance + right performance) is 
less than 63 (Heaton, Smith, Lehman, & Vogt, 1978; Mittenberg, Rotholic, Russell, & 
Heilbronner, 1996).    
The Trail Making Test (Trails A & B).  The Trail-Making Test is a measure of 
mental flexibility, concentration, and visual-motor coordination. This measure is divide  
into two parts, part A and part B (Army Test Battery, 1944).  Part A is simply a sheet of 
paper scattered with circles containing numbers. The participant is required to draw a line 
connecting the different circles in numeric order (1-25). Because in part A the subject is 
simply going in numeric order, this task does not have an executive component and rather 
is a measure of speed of information processing, specifically visual scanning, a d visual-
motor abilities.  Part B has numbers and letters in circles scattered randomly across the 
instrument.  As in part A, the participant draws a line connecting the circles in order;
however, in part B the subject is required to alternate from number to letter, starting with 
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the circle marked with the “1” next to the circle marked with “A” then to “2” then to “B”, 
etc.  Part B is an executive functioning measure and it correlates positively w th number 
of perseverative errors on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Lezak, Howieson, & Loring, 
2004), a classic executive functioning test.  Many studies have examined the reliability 
for the Trail-Making Test, with most reporting reliability between .60 and .90 (Spreen & 
Strauss, 1998).  
Procedure  
 IRB approval was obtained from Oklahoma State University (Appendix A, page 
68) and the University of North Texas (Appendix B, page 69).  In addition, all 
participants and their parents were treated in accordance with the American 
Psychological Association Ethical Code (APA, 2002).  Prior to beginning the experiment, 
informed consent was obtained from the parent.  This involved the overall purpose of the 
study, hypotheses of the study, information regarding the confidentiality of the data, and 
the possible benefits and risks of this study.  To maintain the integrity of the children’s 
performances in both conditions, children were not present while informed consent was 
obtained from parents.  Following study completion, parents were provided with an 
estimate of their child’s intellectual capacity via an administration of the Kaufman Brief 
Intelligence Test, 2nd edition (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004).  Parents were also provided 
with $20.00 for their time and effort in allowing their child to take part in the study.  
Children were also provided with a small prize at the end of the study for their 
participation.   
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 Regarding the potential risks, parents were informed of the slight possibility, 
although highly unlikely, that children in the experimental condition would possibly 
exhibit sub-optimal effort in future tasks as a result of taking part in this study.  However, 
in order to minimize this risk, the children were not provided with their prize until they 
completed a brief task with the examiner at full effort.  There were no known risks for the 
control condition.  Finally, the parents were reminded that their participation was 
voluntary and that they could withdraw their child from the study at any time. 
 The first examiner next obtained assent from the child, which involved a brief 
summary of the experiment (e.g., you are going to be taking some tests, these are sort of 
like games).  The child was first administered the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test-2nd 
Edition (KBIT-2), which is a brief measure of overall intellectual functioning.  All 
children were briefly encouraged before the administration of the KBIT-2 to put forth 
their best effort.  Following this administration, the children were randomly assigned into 
either the experimental or the control condition.  This was accomplished by having the 
child pull a slip of paper out of an envelope, which indicated whether they would 
participate in the full effort “control” condition or the poor effort “treatment” condition.  
In addition, two separate envelopes were used, one for children within the ages of 6-9 and
one for children within the ages of 10-12.  These separate envelopes were utilized in 
order to ensure roughly equal distribution of ages across the two conditions.  If the child 




 “You did really well on this test and I can tell you tried your best.  Now you are 
 going to take some more tests with someone else and I want you to continue 
 trying your best and you will get a present at the end of the session.  Do you 
 understand what you are supposed to do?” 
 
They then proceeded to another room where they were tested by a second examiner who 
was blind to their condition.  If the child’s paper indicated the treatment condition, they 
were read the following:   
 
“You did really well on this test and I can tell you tried your best.  Now we are 
going to play a little game.  What I would like you to do in this game is pretend 
like you are not as smart as you really are.  Do not try your best anymore. I want 
you to get some things wrong even though you know the answers. But, don’t get 
so many wrong that the person giving you the tests will know that you are not 
trying your best. If you can get wrong answers but make the tester think you are 
trying your best, you will get a present at the end of the session.  Do you 
understand what you are supposed to do?” 
 
Following these instructions, to see if the child understood what was expected they were 
given the following simple memory task: 
  
 “So, for example, I want you to remember these words, but don’t try your best: 




If the child did not make any mistakes, they were read the following: 
  
 “Remember, you are not supposed to try your best, let’s try again: apple, table, 
 penny.”  
 
As with the control condition, the child next went to a separate room where they were 
given the remaining measures from a second examiner. 
 After the protocol was completed, the children returned to the room with the first 
administrator for debriefing.  Children in the control condition were allowed to choose a 
toy and thanked for their hard work.  The children in the experimental condition were 
asked if it was difficult for them to lower their effort and asked if they did anythi g 
specifically to lower their performance.  They were next reminded that it ws very 
important to always try their best and that they were only asked to not try their best this 
one time so that we could be able to know if children are not trying their best, so we can 
better help them.  They then were asked to do a simple task at full effort, such as naming 
their three favorite foods and were allowed to choose a toy and thanked for participating 
in the study.  While the first administrator was finishing with the children and parents, the 
second administrator completed a form in which they indicated which condition they 
thought the child was in, why specifically they thought this condition, and any other 
potentially relevant observations.    








  A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted in order to 
examine potential differences between the control group and the simulated poor effort 
group (treatment group) on the cognitive and symptom validity measures.  A separate 
MANOVA was conducted to explore possible intellectual differences between the 
children in the control condition and children in the treatment condition on the KBIT-2.  
Two T-tests were also conducted in order to test for significance between the IQ’s 
generated for the control group (both at full effort) and significance between th  IQ’s 
generated for the treatment group (one at full effort, one poor effort).  It was anticip ted 
that the children in the treatment condition would perform more poorly overall than the 
children in the full effort condition, particularly on symptom validity measures (e.g., 
TOMM).  In addition, it was anticipated that IQ’s generated in the control conditi  
would not differ significantly, while the IQ’s generated for the treatment group would 





 One-way multivariate analysis of variance did not yield a main effect for 
condition, F(1, 32) = 1.026, p = .499.  However, several significant univariate effects did 
emerge, including significant effects for WASI full scale IQ (p = .022), WASI nonverbal 
IQ (p = .033), WASI Matrix Reasoning (p =.008), TOMM trial 1 (p = .001), TOMM trial 
2 (p = .001), and TOMM Retention (p = .001).  In addition, finger tapping total and 
finger tapping non-dominant were both approaching significance (p’s = .074 & .067, 
respectively) (Table 2).  It is also worth noting that even though the other measures were 
not found to significantly differentiate the conditions; average performances on every 
measure were grossly lower in the treatment condition than the control condition (Table
3).  
 Due to finger tapping being entered as raw scores, an additional MANCOVA was 
conducted to rule out the possibility that this trend may have been confounded by age.  
This did reveal a significant main effect for age, F(1, 32) = 6.231, p = .005.  However, 
univariate effects for finger tapping total and finger tapping non-dominant were still 
approaching significance with this control in place (p’s = .080 & .067, respectively).    
 A separate analysis of variance (ANOVA) that examined possible differenc s 
between the conditions on the KBIT-2 (which was full effort for all children) did not 
yield a main effect for condition, F(1, 32) = 1.792, p = .170.  This includes no significant 
differences between full scale IQ’s for the control children (M = 109.94, SD = 10.48) and 
treatment children (M = 107.76, SD = 12.97) (p = .594), verbal quotients (control M = 
102.65, SD = 10.67; treatment M = 106.12, SD = 11.38, p = .366) and nonverbal 
intelligence (control M = 114.05, SD = 10.78; treatment M = 106.94, SD = 14.78, p = 
.119).   
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 A dependent t-test revealed no significant differences between the control 
children’s full scale IQ’s on the KBIT-2 (M = 109.94, SD = 10.48) and WASI (M = 
108.18, SD = 11.29), t(16) = 1.072,  p = .300.  Treatment children did demonstrate a 
significantly poorer IQ performance on the WASI (M = 97.94, SD = 13.45) relative to 
their full effort KBIT-2 IQ (M = 107.76, SD = 12.97), t(16) = 2.598,  p = .019.       
Intellectual Measures 
 Consistent with hypotheses, the treatment condition’s full scale intelligence was 
significantly lower on the WASI than the control condition, although there were no 
significant differences between the conditions on the KBIT-2, which was administered at 
full effort for both groups.  In addition, the children in the treatment condition also 
performed significantly lower on the WASI IQ than their own full effort KBIT-2 IQ.  
These findings clearly indicate that the children in the treatment condition were fully 
capable of lowering their intellectual performance with the minimal coaching that was 
provided.  Interestingly, nonverbal IQ but not verbal IQ emerged as significantly different 
between groups and the only individual intellectual performance that was significantly 
different was Matrix Reasoning.  This includes Block Design, Vocabulary, and 
Similarities not reaching significance.  Overall, this pattern of the comprehensive full 
scale intelligence quotient and nonverbal quotient differentiating the conditions, but not 3 
of the 4 individual tests reaching significance, suggests that perhaps the childr n were 
subtly lowering their effort across measures, with the exception of more pronounced 





 Although not quite reaching statistical significance, a possible trend emerged fo  
fingertapping, with the treatment condition nearly reaching significance for nondominant 
and combined performances when compared to the control condition.  This finding is 
consistent with the adult malingering literature, although the children in the pres nt study 
performed on average marginally higher than what has been found in adults (combined 
average of 68, as opposed to the recommended combined cut-off of 63 for adults).  
Interestingly, dominant fingertapping performances were  not as near to significant as 
nondominant and combined performances, although the treatment condition did fewer 
taps on average than the treatment condition (control dominant M = 39; treatment 
dominant M = 35).   
 Neither trial of the Trial Making Test was significantly different be ween 
conditions, although average performances were lower for the treatment condition (Trails 
A control X = 53, Trails A treatment X = 63; Trails B control X = 133, Trails B treatment 
X = 162).  Errors on these measures also did not differ significantly between conditions.             
Symptom Validity Performances 
 The participants’ performances on the TOMM were promising with regard to 
specificity, as every child in the control condition performed above the cut-off of 45 on 
both the second administration and the retention (delayed) trials, with an average second 
administration performance of 49.76 and average retention also of 49.71.  In addition, all 
but 4 control children performed above 44 on trial 1, with an average performance of 
45.71.   
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 Performances in the treatment effort condition on the TOMM raise sensitivity 
concerns regarding the use of this measure in younger populations.  This is due to only 
slightly over half (10 of 17) of the treatment children performing below the cut-off of 45 
on trial 2 and the same number performing below the cut-off for the retention trial (these 
were not all the same children), with average performances of 38.12 and 35.35 for trial 2 
and the retention trial respectively.  It should be noted that 12 of 17 (71%) of the children 
in the treatment condition performed below 45 on the 1st trial of the TOMM, with an 
average performance of 37.29, although this trial is typically considered a measure of 
recognition memory rather than symptom validity.  
 Performances on the Dot Counting Test were not significant between groups.  
This includes no significant effects for response time to grouped dots, ungrouped dots, 
average response time across groups, total correct dots, and difference between r sponse 
time of grouped and ungrouped dots.  There does, however, appear to be a slight trend 
with the latter as the average difference in response time between the group d and 
ungrouped dots was slightly shorter for the treatment children (p = .11) when one control 
outlier was removed from the analysis.                
Examiner Observations 
 As part of collecting data in this study, examiners were instructed to be mindful of 
any behavioral indicators that could assist in discerning if the child was not putting forth 
a reasonable effort on the measures.  Overall, the child’s TOMM performances wer  the 
most consistently reported determinant in establishing whether the child was in the 
control or treatment condition.  Block design was the second most identified task 
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establishing effort, although this test did not significantly differentiate the groups.  Matrix 
Reasoning and finger tapping were the two neuropsychological measures least reported 
by examiners, although they were found to be the most effective in identifying 
underperforming.  However, the lack of attention these measures received could be 
related to the relatively passive role the examiner plays in their administration, as little 
feedback or instructions are provided once the task has commenced.  Other reported 
behavioral indicators included mistakes on easy items while getting more difficult tems 
correct, reports of confusion on relatively simple tasks, and the child giving up 
prematurely.     
 Examiners also noted that some children appeared to fluctuate with regard to their 
underperforming; appearing to put forth good effort on some tests while appearing to 
intentionally underperform on other tests.  Younger children were observed to engage in 
more obvious behaviors suggestive of underperforming (e.g., laughing after a grossly 
incorrect response on Vocabulary, asking the second examiner if they were not supposed 
to try their best).  In general, older children were observed to engage in more 
sophisticated methods of underperforming, such as intermittently getting items incorrect 
or providing answers that were nearly correct on tests with open ended questions.  It 
should be noted, however, that some of the older children engaged in unusual behaviors 
as well, just not as frequently as the younger children.  For example, one of the older 
children reportedly got lost while trying to find the restroom which was straight down the 





 Overall, the examiners were highly accurate in identifying the condition of the 
children.  As mentioned previously, the TOMM was the most typically cited instrument 
in assisting with this determination.  In general, accuracy was slightly reater for the full 
effort children (15 of 17 correctly identified), although the majority of the children in the 
treatment condition were also correctly identified (13 of 17 correctly identified).  Of the 6 
cases that were misidentified, 4 were false negatives while 2 were false positives.  
Interestingly, when examining these by age, the false negatives were all above the age of 
10, while the false positives were below the age of 10, which again suggests that the older 
children were more convincing with regard to their faking performance.  This also 
suggests that younger children are possibly more prone to engage in erratic behaviors t t 
may be perceived as underperforming, although these findings should both be considered 
preliminary due to the small sample size.     
Reported Strategies 
 Consistent with prior research, older children tended to report more sophisticated 
strategies in underperforming than younger children, which was also consistent with 
examiners’ observations.  For example, older children reported alternating be ween 
periods of full effort and poor effort throughout the testing, such as giving an incorrect 
response following a certain number of correct responses.   Younger children tended to 
report simplistic strategies, such as simply not trying their best.  However, it should be 









 The present investigation sought to further elucidate malingered presentations of 
children on neuropsychological and symptom validity measures.  This was accomplished 
through the administration of the WASI, TOMM, Dot Counting Test, Trail Making Test, 
and fingertapping to children in either a full effort control condition or a simulated 
malingering treatment condition.  This study also assessed the full effort intellectual 
capacity of all participants prior to randomization, thus allowing for further inquiry 
regarding possible intellectual differences between the groups and to provide further
evidence that the children were truly underperforming.    
 The first hypothesis regarding the control children performing significantly be ter 
than the children in the treatment group on measures of neuropsychological and 
intellectual functioning was partially supported, as the groups differed significantly on 
Matrix Reasoning and nearly reached significance on finger tapping.  In addition, the 
WASI full scale intelligence quotients as well as nonverbal quotients both significantly 
differentiated the conditions.  The remaining individual WASI subtests (Block Design, 
Vocabulary, and Similarities) did not reach significance.  This pattern of signiicance for  
the intellectual quotients but not for all of the individual subtests likely suggests that the -
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 intellectual quotients but not for all of the individual subtests likely suggests that the 
children were putting forth a consistent, yet subtle, pattern of underperforming across 
subtests.  The Trail Making Test (Trails A & B) did not significantly differ b tween the 
groups.   
 The next hypothesis regarded the use of the Dot Counting Test for assessing effort 
in children; however, this measure was not found to differentiate the conditions.  It was 
hypothesized that perhaps this was due to the younger children’s performances er sing 
differences with the older children, as younger children are likely not as skilled at 
counting as older children and also may be more prone to count the grouped dots 
individually.  However, controlling for age still did not yield significant differences 
between groups.  As Blaskewitz et al (year) described, another possibility is that this task 
may be overly engaging to children, as it requires active participation which may 
interfere with the child’s capacity to intentionally underperform.  The computerized 
administration of this task also may have resulted in a tendency for children to break 
from their malingered presentations, as they were instructed to play a game with the 
examiner and perhaps would have approached this task differently had the examiner 
administered this test.  Regardless, at this time it is not recommended that the Do
Counting Test be administered for the purpose of effort detection in children.           
 This study also sought to further explore the TOMM as a valid measure of effort 
with younger individuals, although the findings were inconclusive.  Consistent with past 
research (Blaskewitz, et al, 2008; Constantinou, et al, 2003; Donders, 2005; Nagle et al, 
2006), it is apparent that children, even as young as six, are capable of passing both the 
second trial and the retention trial of this test.  However, problems with sensitivity clearly 
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emerged with the treatment children, as slightly less than half of this treatment sample 
passed either the second trial or retention trial, and five of the children passed both trials.  
Due to this lack of consistency with the treatment condition, it is not recommended that 
the TOMM be utilized as a standalone assessment of effort in child populations.  Rather,
as is recommended with adults, the TOMM should be utilized as one of many potential 
sources that address effort, with attention on both multiple symptom validity measures as 
well as performances on standard cognitive tests (Larrabee, 2003).  However, hen 
considering the past findings of the TOMM (Blaskewitz, et al, 2008; Constantinou, et al, 
2003; Donders, 2005; Nagle et al, 2006) with the present finding of all the control 
children passing both trial 2 and the retention trial, failure of this measure by children 6 
and older should raise serious concerns regarding effort validity.          
 In general, the children appeared to have more difficulty lowering their effort on 
tasks when they were explicitly asked to do something and provided feedback regarding 
their performance (e.g., Trails being corrected, being queued regarding respons s on 
Vocabulary).  It is also possible that tasks that are more cognitively engaging may be 
more difficult for younger individuals to exhibit sub-optimal effort.  As described by 
Blaskewitz et al., who also found this trend, children may have difficulty 
underperforming when the cognitive demands of the task exceeded their ability to 
effectively monitor their underperforming.  For example, given the attention and visual 
scanning demands of the Trail Making Test, it is possible that the children may have 
reduced their underperforming in an effort to meet the high cognitive demands of thi  
task.  It is also worth noting that the two individual measures that significantly 
differentiated children, (TOMM and Matrix Reasoning) are both multiple choice frmat.  
51 
 
It is therefore possible that the reduction in concentrative demand that is inherent in 
multiple choice tests may lead to the greater sensitivity found with these measures, at 
least with children.     
 Block Design provided an interesting case, as this study was the first to examin  
this measure within the context of malingering in children and was the second most 
reported instrument by the second examiner in attempting to determine children’s effort, 
and yet did not reach statistical significance.  As with the Trail Making Test, it is 
certainly possible that the high cognitive demands of Block Design may have reduc d 
children’s capacity to perform poorly, resulting in the null hypothesis.  However, what 
remains unclear is why this measure was so frequently identified as abnormal by 
examiners during the battery administration, yet failed to emerge as significant. 
 It is also worth noting that finger tapping nearly differentiated the two conditi s.  
To the author’s knowledge, this is the first investigation that has explored this test within 
the context of a simulation study of younger children.  Given that finger tapping has 
received considerable support within the adult literature as an identifier of sub-reasonable 
effort (Heaton et al., 1978; Mittenberg, et al, 1996), the present finding warrants further 
inquiry in establishing more definitive guidelines regarding children’s performances.  
One question that is immediately apparent based on the present findings is whether the 
expected average of underperforming in children is higher than adults or if the slghtly 
higher average found in child simulators is simply an artifact of this small ample size.        
 In addition to these hypotheses, also explored was examiners accuracy in 
identifying children who are underperforming.  Although not surprising given that the 
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expected malingering base rate of children in the study was 50%, the examiners 
demonstrated a high degree of accuracy in identifying the children’s condition, as they 
identified 88% of the children in the control condition and 76% of the treatment children.  
Interestingly, false positives were only found in children under the age of 10, while false 
negatives were only found in children 10 and above.  This suggests that older children’s 
malingered presentations were more convincing than their younger counterparts, while 
younger children may exhibit behaviors that may raise validity concerns eve though 
they theoretically are putting forth reasonable effort.  As with Blaskewitz et al., 
examiners also briefly interviewed the children regarding malingering strategies and 
found that older children were more likely to engage in more sophisticated strategy than 
younger children (e.g., providing incorrect responses intermittently).  However, the 
majority of children had significant difficulty clearly articulating a faking strategy.   
 As with all simulation studies, this study lacks external validity due to there not 
being a true malingering sample (Bernard, 1990; Rogers et al, 1993).  Simulation designs 
also have multiple potential confounds with regard to how individuals with a more 
substantial secondary gain may perform, as well as potential personality confounds that 
could lead one to be more likely to engage in deceptive behaviors (e.g., anti-social 
personality disorder, which has been linked to specific cognitive profiles; Dinn & Harris, 
2000).  Given that children’s base rates for malingering on neuropsychological measures 
are not known, but are presumed to be substantially lower than adults, it would be 
exceedingly difficult to identify and effectively measure this behavior as it exists within 
the normal populous.  Although not completely out of the realm of possibilities for a 
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known-group design to be conducted, it is likely that these examinations will continue 
within the more controllable simulated design.           
 Future investigations may benefit from exploring the impact of more directive 
coaching on children’s ability to realistically feign cognitive impairment.  For example, it 
is certainly possible that within the context of pending litigation a child may receive more 
substantial explanation regarding strategies that could lead to a more believa l  cognitive 
performance, possibly even including information regarding specific instruments.  This is 
particularly relevant given that recent studies have highlighted the increasing accessibility 
of the public to information pertaining to symptom validity measures (Ruiz, Drake, 
Glass, Marcotte, & van Gorp, 2002) and have found that adults evidence more 
sophisticated malingering when provided with information regarding symptom validity 
methods and techniques (Youngjohn, Lees-Haley, & Binder, 1999).  As a result, it may 
be helpful for future investigations to provide children with a more thorough 
understanding of the test process, specifically with respect to symptom validity 
techniques.  This could be accomplished by conducting a similar investigation that 
simply raises the children’s awareness of effort detection methods.  In addition, given 
that in this investigation children were encouraged by strangers to underperform, it may 
be worthwhile to explore how children would perform when instructed by someone who 
would be more likely to make this suggestion in the “real world” (e.g., parent), as this 
may increase the child’s commitment to the fake bad role.              







Table 1    Demographics  
 
 Condition:                 Control                                       Treatment  
                               
Age                        X                   SD                                      X                   SD       
                          
        10.06         1.83                     9.71                 2.20         
 
Gender                                    n              n 
  
 Boys            5              6  




 Kindergarten          2              5    
 First           2              1  
 Second           2              1  
 Third           3              1 
 Fourth           3              5 
 Fifth                       4              3 







 10,000 -25,000                     1             1   
 25,000-50,000         3             2 
 50,000-75,000         7             8 


























Table 2     Univariate Effects 
                    
   Measure           Significance 
 
All Full Effort 
 KBIT-2 Verbal     .366     
 KBIT-2 Nonverbal     .119 
 KBIT-2 Full Scale     .594 
 
Experiment 
 WASI Verbal     .161              
 WASI Performance     .033 
 WASI Full Scale IQ    .022 
 Vocabulary      .210    
 Similarities      .130 
 Block Design     .284 
 Matrix Reasoning     .008 
 Finger Tapping Dominant    .110 
 Finger Tapping Non-dominant   .067 
 Finger Tapping Total    .074 
 Trails A      .427 
 Trails A errors     .227 
 Trails B      .239 
 Trails B errors     .520 
 TOMM Trial 1     .001 
 TOMM Trial 2     .001 
 TOMM Retention     .001 
 Dot Counting Overall     .768 
 Dot Counting Grouped    .727 
 Dot Counting Ungrouped    .978 
 Dot Counting Difference    .576 




 Table 3     Test Performances 
               
       Condition:                                 Control                                   Treatment 
 
KBIT*                   Standard Score                    SD                   Standard Score                    SD  
 
Verbal IQ                         102.65                       10.67                  106.12   11.38 
         
Nonverbal IQ                            114.06           10.78                         106.95   14.78 
 





Verbal IQ                         105.72              13.92                    97.35               17.22 
 
Performance IQ             109.35          11.14      100.06                         13.14 
 
Full Scale IQ              108.17          11.29                     97.94                        13.44 
 
 
WASI Subtests    T  SD   T  SD 
 
Vocabulary            50.53             9.44            45.29            13.97 
 
Similarities            55.88             9.19            50.35               11.43 
 
Block Design            53.76             8.80            49.94            11.47 
 
Matrix Reasoning           57.64             7.56            49.52                    8.97  
 
 
Symptom Validity Tests              X  SD   X  SD 
 
TOMM Trial 1            45.71             4.43           37.29                     8.90 
 
TOMM Trial 2            49.76   .75           38.12                   12.96 
 
TOMM Retention                                49.71   .47           35.35            15.64  
 
Dot Counting Total Time              .64   .21                            .67                      .25 
 
Dot Counting Grouped   .49                       .19                                 .52                      .26         
 
Dot Counting Ungrouped              .81   .25   .80   .25  
 




Dot Counting Total Dots        431.64**        118.34**         411.06           43.76  
 
Neuropsychological Measures             X              SD   X  SD 
 
Trails A Time           53.82            20.26            63.00            42.44 
 
Trails A Errors               .24    .44              1.00              2.52 
 
Trails B Time         133.24            45.37          161.94            87.63 
 
Trails B Errors                .65  1.06    .88              1.05 
 
Finger Tapping D            39.73  5.65            35.67  8.45 
 
Finger Tapping ND            37.16   6.19            32.48  8.08 
 
Finger Tapping Total           76.89            11.19            68.15            16.01  
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